Kerala Politics, Identity and the Road to 2026
Q: How do you assess the recent electoral pattern in Kerala?
A: In Assembly elections, the Left Democratic Front (LDF) has shown remarkable strength. It won 90 seats in 2016 and improved its tally to 99 seats in 2021. That was a historic moment, as it marked the first re-election of an incumbent government in Kerala and reflected a clear shift in voter behaviour. However, this trend does not extend uniformly to parliamentary elections. In the 2019 Lok Sabha polls, the United Democratic Front (UDF) won 19 out of 20 seats, with the LDF securing just one by a narrow margin. The pattern repeated in 2024, when the UDF won 18 seats, while the LDF and the BJP/NDA won one seat each. This indicates a real possibility that voters may again swing toward the UDF in the 2026 Assembly elections.
Q: What is the single most important issue shaping Kerala politics today?
A: Social engineering. Caste and community continue to function as decisive political units in Kerala. Roughly half of the population is Hindu, while the remaining half is split between Muslims and Christians. Muslims constitute around 30% and Christians about 18%, making both communities electorally decisive. The CPI(M), in practice, functions largely as a Hindu party because the bulk of its cadre base and voters come from Hindu communities, particularly middle and lower castes, along with sections of upper castes such as Nairs. Middle castes form the backbone of the LDF vote base, while Christian and Muslim representation within the CPI(M) remains marginal.
Q: How important are emotional factors compared to economic issues in elections?
A: Emotional factors are often more decisive than economic ones. The 1991 elections are a classic example. After the LDF’s strong showing in the 1990 district council elections, it opted for early Assembly polls alongside the parliamentary elections. The LDF performed well in the first phase, but the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi midway through the election process completely altered the political mood. The emotional wave that followed resulted in a landslide victory for the Congress-led UDF in Kerala.
Similar emotional shifts were visible later as well. In 2011, the UDF won narrowly. Between 2011 and 2015, it performed well in by-elections, but the solar scam created a strong emotional backlash, paving the way for an LDF victory in 2016. In 2019, the Sabarimala issue triggered a protest vote against the LDF, benefiting the UDF. A similar sentiment was visible in the 2025 local body elections, where the Sabarimala gold theft controversy worked against the LDF.
Q: Where does the BJP fit into this bipolar political landscape?
A: There is a small but crucial segment of swing voters who move between the LDF and UDF. The BJP has emerged as an alternative for voters who are disillusioned with both fronts. Its growth is not uniform, but it is real. The party is increasingly viewed as a viable third option, particularly among sections that feel politically homeless.
Q: What explains the BJP’s breakthrough in Thiruvananthapuram Corporation?
A: Kerala has witnessed a shift from soft Hinduism to soft Hindutva. Earlier, there was a clear distinction between religious practice and political ideology. That distinction has now blurred. A section of voters today automatically prefers a Hindu candidate. Social engineering and the so-called ‘Modi factor’ have had a strong impact, particularly among young voters, professionals and Gen Z. Many of them may not openly align with the RSS or BJP, but they see Narendra Modi as a decisive leader and perceive no credible alternative at the national level.
This support is especially visible among elite white-collar professionals—doctors, engineers, senior bureaucrats—and retired defence personnel.
Q: Is the Modi factor limited to Hindu voters?
A: No. It cuts across religious lines. Even within Christian-dominated areas, BJP candidates are beginning to attract a noticeable share of votes. The party’s Christian outreach programmes have yielded results that were unthinkable a decade ago.
Q: How has the BJP managed this despite narratives of minority insecurity?
A: Kerala’s Christian society is not monolithic. Influential groups are largely Catholics and Syrian Christians, who are socially and culturally classified as forward castes. Syrian Christians, in particular, share close cultural ties with upper-caste Hindu communities such as Nairs. The Kerala Congress traditionally represented these interests. These groups are culturally conservative and incline toward soft Hinduism or soft Hindutva. Their earlier hesitation toward the BJP has largely disappeared.
In the 2024 elections, upper-caste consolidation clearly favoured the BJP. In Thiruvananthapuram, anti-incumbency against the Corporation administration also worked in the BJP’s favour, enabling it to consolidate upper-caste votes, sections of Christians, and even some Muslim and Nadar votes.
Q: Do international developments influence minority voting behaviour in Kerala?
A: Yes. Unlike North India, Kerala does not have a historical Hindu–Muslim antagonism rooted in conquest or Partition. Christianity and Islam were accepted as missionary religions under Hindu rulers, resulting in cultural coexistence. However, global developments do have emotional resonance. The rise of the Islamic State and the persecution of Syrian Christians in West Asia deeply affected Christian sentiment in Kerala. The conversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, and public support for it by leaders in Kerala, also created emotional responses.
Incidents such as the hand-chopping of Professor T.J. Joseph and debates around ‘Love Jihad’, though limited, have had a psychological impact. The absence of towering mediators and growing ideological rigidity among community organisations have further widened gaps, which the BJP has been able to exploit electorally, particularly in places like Thrissur.
Q: Why did Christians support the LDF in parts of Thrissur during recent local elections?
A: Performance matters. Social engineering cannot override dissatisfaction with governance. In areas where elected representatives failed to deliver, voters shifted allegiance. In hilly regions, migrant Christian communities from Central Kerala and Malabar fear political marginalisation and perceive both the Congress and CPI(M) as practising minority appeasement. Concerns related to education policy, administrative priorities and local governance also influence voting decisions.
Q: Will minority consolidation continue to favour the UDF?
A: Kerala politics follows a cyclical pattern. Strong performances in local elections are often followed by Assembly victories. However, the vote-share gap between the Congress and CPI(M) is narrow—illustrating how difficult it is to decisively tilt the balance. Anti-incumbency against a decade-long government is real. While large infrastructure projects benefit the upper classes, salaried middle-class groups such as government employees and teachers increasingly feel excluded.
Q: Can a change in leadership alter the LDF’s prospects?
A: Leadership matters, but organisational control matters more. While alternative leaders may enjoy public popularity, the existing leadership maintains firm control over the party machinery. At present, social coalitions appear to favour the UDF, especially in Central Kerala. In Malabar, sections of Muslim voters who earlier supported the LDF are moving back toward the Muslim League.
Q: Why did the Sabarimala issue benefit the UDF more than the BJP?
A: Voters generally prefer formations they believe can win. While both the UDF and BJP supported the believers’ position, voters channelled their protest toward the more electorally viable alternative, which was the UDF. At the same time, poor local governance limited the BJP’s gains in several constituencies.
Kerala’s political culture favours moderation—soft Hindutva and soft secularism. Even among Left supporters, religious belief remains widespread.
Q: Does the LDF’s cadre system still hold?
A: Absolutely. The cadre system remains the LDF’s strongest asset and is the main reason the BJP has not been able to penetrate deeply into Hindu vote banks. The CPI(M) continues to function as the largest Hindu political formation in Kerala. Unlike West Bengal, the organisational base in Kerala—particularly in regions like Kannur—remains intact. However, swing voters are currently tilting toward the UDF and the BJP.
Q: What will define the narrative of the 2026 Assembly elections?
A: Development and social protection will be central to the LDF’s campaign. The BJP will seek credit for central infrastructure projects such as highways and ports. Hostility toward the BJP is gradually eroding, but the party still lacks strong grassroots leaders with deep local connections.
Q: How influential are national leaders in Kerala politics?
A: National leaders enjoy significant goodwill. There is a positive public perception around Congress leadership, even among voters who may still prefer Narendra Modi as Prime Minister.
One crucial but underreported trend is the livelihood struggle of the migrant Christian Farmers (Thiruithamkoor Chettanmar) settled in the hilly tracts of Malabar. They are electorally decisive in around 16 constituencies and are affected by issues such as human–wildlife conflict and the decline of the agrarian economy, particularly rubber cultivation. This group also carries a latent sense of insecurity regarding political Islam.
Q: Are issues like SIR resonating with voters?
A: Not at all. These remain elite-driven narratives with little traction among ordinary voters. None of the major political fronts have treated them as serious electoral issues.
Interestingly, sections of financially secure Muslims are also gravitating toward the BJP to protect business interests. At the same time, overseas networks continue to play a crucial role in mobilising resources for the Muslim League.
Q: What about smaller political experiments like the BDJS?
A: The BDJS experiment has largely failed. The Ezhava middle class continues to remain with the CPI(M). However, the party’s perceived Muslim appeasement has alienated sections of middle-caste Hindus and Christians, leading to minor shifts toward the BJP—even in traditional Left strongholds.
Q: Has the CPI(M) lost any important social constituencies?
A: Yes. The party has lost a considerable chunk of votes of the Ezhava and Thiyya Community (Middle Caste) which is self-evident at Thiruvananthapuram, Attingal and Alappuzha Parliament constituencies in the 2024 Loksabha election. The party has lost sections of what was once considered its women’s constituency because of the Sabarimala issue. Muslim support for the LDF is not permanent and remains largely issue-based. Initiatives such as the Nava Kerala Sadas proved to be a misadventure and failed to generate any meaningful political impact.
Q: Who are the likely leadership faces in the next Assembly election?
A: If the LDF returns to power, Pinarayi Vijayan is likely to continue as Chief Minister, with M.V. Govindan also being a possible option. On the UDF side, V.D. Satheesan has established himself as a strong and effective Leader of the Opposition.
Q: Do celebrities influence electoral outcomes in Kerala?
A: Celebrity popularity does not automatically translate into political support in Kerala. Film stars and other public figures may command large fan followings, but these rarely convert into votes during elections. Despite national stature, figures such as P.T. Usha have little to no measurable political impact in Kerala
Q: How polarised are voting patterns in regions like Kasaragod?
A: In districts such as Kasaragod, political polarisation is absolute. Hindus largely vote for the BJP, while Muslims consolidate behind the UDF.